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NOTE AND COMMENT
CHILD LADOR LAW CAs-CoMIRCE POWXR OV CONGRESS AND &SERVXD
POWIRS oV THZ SATxs.-The decision in the Child Labor Law case, Hamtncr
v. Dagenhart, - U. S. -, 62 L. ed. -, decided June 3, I918, would have
caused much less surprise twenty-five years ago than it did when announced
last June, for it is based upon two constitutional provisions concerning which
the much wider and more varied experience of the last quarter century had
developed theories, better defined and sounder than those of the earlier period.
Those two provisions are the Tenth Amendment regarding the powers re-
served to the States and the Commerce Clause. There has been an astonish-
ing amount of faulty reasoning about the Tenth Amendment in its relation
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to Federal powers. Over and over again courts and writers have argued as
if certain powers, or powers of certain kinds had been reserved to the States
and therefore that the Federal Government could not possibly have or exer-
cise powers that touched those fields; or, to put it otherwise, that the Federal
Government could not exercise even its granted powers, as those over com-
merce or to make treaties, if such exercise would affect matters concerning
which the States also possessed power. But this is a diametrically wrong way
to approach the distribution of powers between the Federal and the State
Governments. Certain powers have been given to the Federal Government. In
the nature of the case, and as the Supreme Court has declared repeatedly,
these powers, many. of them stated only in geenral outline, are and must be
c apable of indefinite expansion, or more accurately their application is and
must be to a changing and always increasing number of objects and situations.
As this process of extending the application of the commerce power to
new subjects proceeds, it will necessarily follow in a great many cases that
powers of the States, the exercise of which would conflict with these exer-
tions of Federal power, must be suspended pro tanto during the life of the
Federal law. There are many familiar examples of this. The States may in
general adopt and administer their own laws of quarantine, of pilotage, of
the regulation of internal traffic, and the sale of goods, but if Congress should
enact a law, as unquestionably it has the power to do, regulating quarantine
at all ports, all State laws in conflict therewith would necessarily be suspended
at least during the life of the Federal quarantine statute. Morgan S. S. Co.
v. La. Board of Health, 1x8 U. S. 455, 463. The same results would follow
the enactment of a Federal pilotage scheme. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
Philadelphia, x2 How. 299; Anderson v. Pac. S. S. Co., 225 U. S. 187.
Congressional regulations of interstate commerce as to subjects of trans-
portation and as to methods of transportation have caused innumerable re-
strictions upon the power of the States in regard to these matters. Gibbons
v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. i; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; The Daniel Ball,
io Wall. 557; Northern Pac. Ry. v. Washington, 22 U. S. 370; Wabash, etc.
Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 1I8 U. S. 557; Mich. Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59;
Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. I.
To come still nearer to the case in hand, when Congress enacted the Pure
Food Law, it of course prevented the transportation into other states of food
made or put up in violation of its terms, thus diminishing the market and
hence indirectly affecting manufacture of goods even though made in com-
plete conformity with the State law. Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative v.
U. S., 239 U. S. 5io. When Congress prohibited the carrying of lottery tick-
ets in interstate commerce, even though the lottery as an institution were
legally recognized by the State, it necessarily diminished the importance and
value which the institution would have had except for this restriction.' Lot-
tery Case, 188 U. S. 321.
The Webb-Kenyon Act, Act of March I, 1913, 37 Stat 669, c. go, by which
Congress authorized the States to exercise their police power in regard to
the importation and use of liquor from other states has been held to be an
exercise of the Congressional power over commerce whereby the law of one
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State may effectively restrict the market for goods manufactured in another
State, though the manufacture in such other State were entirely lawful.
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311. Unless the pro-
posed Federal prohibition amendment shall be adopted, undoubtedly each
state may prohibit or permit by license or otherwise the sale and use of
liquor. Nevertheless by the Congressional act a partial prohibition in inter-
state commerce is in effect produced, and that prohibition limits the powers
of States quite as effectively as the Supreme Court says it was sought to be
limited by the Child Labor Law.
The same problem may be approached from the point of view of the exer-
cise of aother power and with the same results. The President is given the
power to make treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(Art. II, § I, Cl. 2.) Treaties may concern any subject proper for inter-
national treatment not prohibited by the Constitution. They may then and
commonly do relate to many matters of great importance to the State intern-
ally, such as the purchase, sale, holding, and descent of real property, the
right of the nationals of other powers to engage in business in the United
States, and an indefinite number of matters more or less associated with
these. The United States has repeatedly executed treaties affecting these
matters, which are of course subject in general to the powers of the States,
and yet when the paramount power of the national government isproperly
exercised the power of the State government is necessarily correspondingly
restricted or suspended. Fairfax's Devisees, 7 Cranch 627; Ware v. Hylton,
3 Dall. 242; Hauenslein v. Lynham, ioo U. S. 483.
The restricting effect, which the exercise of the treaty making power has
upon State authority over matters which would ordinarily be regarded as
within the so-called powers of the States has been admirably discussed in
Corwin's "The Treaty Making Power and National Supremacy." The con-
trary view, but one which seems indefensible is ably presented in Tucker's
"Limitations Upon the Treaty Making Power.'
It is submitted that the theoretically correct mode of determining what
powers are reserved to the State or the people under the Tenth Amendment
is to first ascertain what powers are expressly or impliedly granted to the
Federal Government or prohibited to the States by the Federal Constitution
and to subtract these from the totality of governmental powers. And this
is the mode actually taken by the Supreme Court in the great majority of
cases, some of which have been cited above.
If this reasoning be sound, it follows that there were not two but only
one real question to be asked and answered by the Supreme Court in decid-
ing the Child Labor case, and that question was: Is the Child Labor Law
within the scope of the authority conferred upon Congress by the Commerce
Clause? With entire deference we believe that the answer to this question
should have been in the affirmative and that is the view taken by the four
dissenting Justices of the Supreme Court and convincingly presented in the
opinion by Mr. Justice HoIM~s. In other words, if this is a proper regula-
tion of interstate commerce, the law does not infringe at all upon the so-
called reserved powers of the States. In taking up this question the Supreme
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Court seems to us to have fallen into a logical fallacy at the very outset of
the majority opinion, and then to have put an interpretation upon several of
its former decisions which is not tenable. Mr. Justice DAY, who has deliv-
ered many opinions showing an enlightened and forward looking view con-
cerning legislation dealing with social problems, quotes from Gibbons v.
Ogden, as follows:
"It is the power to regulate, that is to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed."
about which he remarks:
"In other words, the power is one to control the means by which
commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the as-
sumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroying
it as to particular commodities. But it is insisted that adjudged
cases in this court establish the doctrine thai the power to regulate
given to Congress incidentally includes the authority to prohibit the
movement of ordinary commodities and therefore that the subject
is not open for discussion. The cases demonstrate the contrary.
They rest upon the character of the particular subjects dealt with
and the fact that the scope of governmental authority, state or
national, possessed over them is such that the authority to prohibit
is as to them but the exertion of the power to regulate."
But is it not quite clear that the power "to prescribe the rule by which
commerce is to be governed", which is Chief Justice MARSHATL'S formula,
is very much more comprehensive than "the power to control the means by
which commerce is carried on", which is Mr. Justice DAY's statement? To
prescribe rules by which commerce is to be governed is obviously to control
the whole life of commerce including dealing not only with the instrumental-
ities of commerce but with commerce itself and its subject matter. Perhaps
it is the narrower interpretation that the power includes only the right to
control the means of commerce which. led the majority of the court in the
present case to the conclusion that Congress has no power to prohibit com-
merce except where the subject matter of such commerce is in and of itself
pernicious and productive of injury after the act of commerce is closed.
With great respect it is submitted that this cannot be the correct view. That
a power to regulate includes the power to prohibit in proper cases has been
established in many kinds of regulation. It is sufficient here to refer to pro-
hibitions of commerce of which well known examples may be found in the
following cases. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (liquor) ; the Lottery case, i88
32T; Hipolite Egg Co. v. U. S., 220 U. S. 45 (food) ; U. S. v. Lexington Mill
& Elevator Co., 232 U. S. 399; Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308 (white slave);
Caminetti v. U. S., 242 U. S. 470 (white slave).
The court, in seeking to distinguish these cases from the one before it in
order to establish its proposition that prohibition is permissible under the
commerce clause only when the subject matter of such commerce may be
productive of injury arising after the commerce is completed, falls into what
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seems to us an error which perhaps may be traced to a sentence in U. S. v.
E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. i, to the effect that manufacture precedes com-
merce. This is of course true. But it is an obvious non-sequitur to say that
therefore Congress cannot exert its power over commerce merely because
such exercise would through commerce indirectly affect manufacture. Cer-
tainly the commerce power was not given to Congress for the sole purpose
of regulating and promoting commerce as an end in and of itself. There is
abundant evidence that it was given not only to prevent the abuses of which
some of the states had been guilty in dealing with commerce under the Arti-
cles of Confederation and of promoting commerce as a means of promotion
of the general welfare, but also for the purpose of securing that general
welfare by any regulation of commerce productive of such effect and not
forbidden by other clauses in the constitution. What possible difference can
it make whether the evil aimed at may have been caused before the particu-
lar act of transportation has taken place or after it? If the privilege of such
interstate transportation and commerce be greatly enlarged the market for
the goods transported thus increases the scale of manufacture and the evil
which such manufacture produces. That evil in this case includes of course
the injury to the child's health, moral and spiritual welfare, and the cutting
off of its opportunity for a reasonable amount of education.
The dissenting opinion makes it clear that the real and substantial infrac-
tion of the powers of the state governments is caused by denying to Congress
the power to regulate this matter and thus putting it within the power of the
several states to ship their goods into other states, not only without the con-
sent of the latter but contrary to their established public policy in regard to
child labor or whatever else may be involved. Of course the states did not
have such extraterritorial power before the adoption of the constitution, and
it is absurd to suppose that it was intended to be given to them by that in-
strument. In the argument of the present case, the government showed very
clearly that one effect of the existence of legislation forbidding child labor
in some states and the non-existence of such legislation in others is to drive
the greedy and conscienceless manufacturers from the states with this en-
lightened legislation to those which have it not. Not only that, but the goods
made in the latter class of states must now be received and may be sold in
the other states and to consumers who may have conscientious scruples against
the use of such goods and who have no means of knowing whether in fact
child labor has been employed in the manufacture.
The scientific and popular opinion is so strong for the prohibition of child
labor in this country that it is certain to be obtained sooner or later. It
would seem clear that this object may be obtained by an exercise of the
taxing power of Congress under the doctrine laid down in McCray v. U. S.,
i05 U. S. 27. H. M. B.
